A new era of US leadership is taking shape under President Donald Trump’s second term. Within hours of taking office, he withdrew the US from key international agreements, including the World Health Organisation and the Paris Climate Agreement. Although this is nothing new – similar moves were taken during Trump’s first term – this time they appear to be part of a strategy to systematically reshape US engagement on its own terms. Under Trump’s “America First” policy, US interactions with alliances big and small will be transactional and shaped by Trump’s personal style of foreign policy. Placing American interests above all else, the US will adopt a tough stance towards coalitions that are deemed not to advance its goals.
This recalibration is particularly significant for US-led minilaterals – small, issue-focused coalitions that have grown in importance over the past five years, often at the expense of multilateral organisations. AUKUS, the powerful defence partnership between the US, UK and Australia in the Indo-Pacific, exemplifies this shift. However, Trump’s scepticism of coalitions both large and small means that minilaterals will come under renewed scrutiny in terms of what the US stands to gain. This shift is likely to have significant implications for key regional alliances, notably the I2U2 and the Quad.
The I2U2: A Test of Trump’s Diplomatic Skills
Under Trump, there are likely to be renewed efforts to revive the US-led I2U2 coalition between India, Israel and the UAE. The group emerged in 2021 following the Abraham Accords – Trump’s signature diplomatic achievement during his first term – which normalised ties between Israel and several Arab states. Its goal was to advance cross-regional economic integration, with region-wide challenges such as water, energy, and food security being a key focus.
However, since the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas in October 2023, the I2U2 has been on pause. The Biden administration expressed a commitment in 2024 to advancing the group’s agenda, but no meaningful progress has been made. After October 7th, the UAE distanced itself from the dialogue, India adopted a "wait and watch" stance, and Washington’s interest appeared to wane. For Israel, the war became the overriding priority.
Reviving the I2U2 would depend on Trump’s ability to navigate intra-group sensitivities and rebuild trust. More significantly, it would require him to present the I2U2 as a building block for broader regional normalisation with Israel by linking Jerusalem’s interests with both Arab and non-Arab states. The key question is whether Trump will expand the group to include potential partners such as Saudi Arabia, making it an I2U2+ or seek an entirely new alliance. The value of I2U2 lies in aligning the interests of countries with a history of disagreement, which in turn benefits the US.
The Quad: A Potential Casualty of the “America First” Policy?
In contrast, Trump’s engagement with the Quad – an Indo-Pacific coalition comprising Australia, India, and Japan – is more uncertain. The grouping’s strategic objectives have changed in recent years from tackling regional challenges in the spheres of maritime security, climate protection, and health policy to counterbalancing China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific. However, under Trump, this alliance is likely to be deprioritised. Trump is sceptical of alliances he perceives as “free riding” on US commitments and is likely to reevaluate the value of the relationship through the lens of its cost to the US relative to its strategic returns. The Quad’s broad scope and soft focus may not resonate with Trump’s narrower strategic focus on countering China and advancing US interests in the Indo-Pacific.
The January 21 meeting of Quad foreign ministers in Washington, DC suggests that Trump has not yet shown overt disinterest or disengagement with the alliance. However, he is unlikely to support it out of sentimentality or loyalty; instead, he will demand that the alliance prioritise US interests first and foremost. If members fail to deliver, he may deprioritise the Quad in favour of transactional bilateral arrangements that are directly beneficial to American interests.
Shifting Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific
Trump’s foreign policy is based on an America First approach to diplomatic relations. However, the tactics he uses to serve US interests are often unpredictable and aim to “wrong foot” his counterparts. His approach to China is likely to be no different. His approach could swing between striking a trade deal with President Xi Jinping and escalating tensions through trade tariffs and sanctions. This uncertainty has already prompted Quad members to hedge their bets and seek to reduce tensions with Beijing. In December 2023, Tokyo announced Japan-China security talks; in October 2024, India agreed to ease border tensions with China; and in June of the same year, Australia renewed economic and diplomatic ties with Beijing after a period of strained relations.
The Path Ahead for US-Led Minilaterals
Looking ahead, Trump is likely to prioritise the I2U2 for its rewards while focusing on the Quad’s ability to deliver in line with his strategic priorities vis-à-vis China. He is expected to have little patience for funding initiatives that fail to align with, or advance, US objectives. This will prompt member states to rethink their approach to US engagement. To sustain Trump's attention and commitment, US partners in minilaterals will need to offer clear economic or strategic benefits in future negotiations.