Senior Iranian diplomats held talks with counterparts from the UK, Germany, and France in January in Switzerland with the aim of developing a roadmap for a new nuclear agreement amid concerns over the trajectory of Iran’s nuclear programme. The Europeans are concerned that the Iranians are close to developing a nuclear weapon capable of threatening its neighbours – notably Israel – and that this, in turn, could trigger a regional nuclear arms race. A week before the talks, President Emmanuel Macron of France declared that “the acceleration of the nuclear programme brings us close to the point of no return.”

Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), between Iran and the P5+1 nations (the United States, China, the UK, France, Russia, plus Germany), Tehran agreed to limit its nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. However, after Trump withdrew the US from the deal in May 2018, Iran accelerated its nuclear programme – lifting the cap on its stockpile of uranium and increasing its uranium enrichment capacity to 60%, which is thirty percentage points below the level required for weapons-grade uranium. Since 2021, Iran has also prevented the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from effectively monitoring its activities.

The contours of any new deal with Iran will depend on the bargaining strategy of US President Donald Trump, who took office on Monday 20 January. However, a confluence of factors presents the parties to the original deal with a rare opportunity for a new agreement. First, Iran’s geopolitical influence has been weakened and its economy is in dire straits. Since the election of President Masoud Pezeshkian – considered a moderate in Iran – in July 2024, Tehran has shown renewed willingness to cooperate with the West on its nuclear programme. Second, the EU wants to strengthen its role in regional affairs amid uncertainty regarding the direction of the Trump administration’s foreign policy. Third, the EU is concerned about the threat level to Europe posed by Iran in light of its support for Russia in Ukraine. 

These factors combined provide an opening to contain the escalation of tensions. The time is now ripe for a new deal. All parties have an interest in making it happen. 

 

Iran on the Backfoot; Europe Plays the Game

Iran is facing significant economic and geopolitical pressure. Sanctions have brought it to the verge of an economic crisis. Its axis of resistance has weakened after a year of setbacks: the fall of the Assad regime in Syria; Hezbollah’s military defeats in Lebanon; and the entrenchment of its biggest ally, Russia, in Ukraine, making support from Moscow unlikely. The Islamic Republic has responded to these blows with strong rhetoric but subdued actions – this indicates that Tehran is proactively avoiding escalation of tensions.   

The Europeans, meanwhile, remain part of the JCPOA. They are re-starting talks with Iran on the nuclear issue and seeking to devise a framework for future negotiations. Their aim in doing so is to reinforce Europe’s position as geopolitical player in the Middle East and position it as an equal partner with the US under Trump. 

Europe also wants to be on track for a new deal before the JCPOA snapback clause expires in October 2025. The mechanism, which reimplements UN sanctions against Iran upon expiry, serves as an incentive for Iran to engage in diplomacy with the West; however, triggering it would prompt Iran to pull out of the deal entirely, which may induce it to double down on its nuclear weapons programme. 

 

Trump 2.0 Diplomacy

Donald Trump’s return to the White House and the unpredictability of his policies is causing an uptick in diplomatic activity between Iran and the Europeans and contributes to the incentive for a new deal. 

Trump’s rationale for pulling the US out of the 2015 JCPOA was that it did not prevent Iran from advancing its nuclear programme, and in practice allowed the Islamic Republic to continue to fund “the axis of resistance.” During his second presidential campaign, Trump threatened to reimpose sanctions in his second term to exert maximum pressure on Tehran, which would cripple the Iranian economy. He also declared his intention to negotiate a new deal; however, this would only happen if Iran offered conditions favourable to US security interests, such as increased transparency and monitoring of the nuclear programme. 

Trump has expressed his desire to strike a major international agreement of his own – and has said publicly that he deserves a Nobel Peace Prize. To achieve this aim, a new nuclear deal with Iran may be the lowest hanging fruit as, unlike a deal to end the conflict in Ukraine or to normalise relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, the US would be directly involved as a party, not merely exercising influence over an ally. 

Trump will also want to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons on his watch, and his control of both houses of Congress and highly loyal entourage makes him all the more able to impose a new deal on the agenda. However, Trump is no stranger to dramatic diplomatic moments with disappointing outcomes – the rapprochement with North Korea in 2018–19 did not result in any tangible steps towards normalisation.

 

The Road is Long

Conditions for successful negotiations with Iran are as favourable as they have ever been since 2018.  All parties involved have an opportunity to advance their interests by reaching an agreement. Iran and the Europeans have already launched the process, but the road to signing a deal is long and depends on American appetite for both creative and gritty diplomacy.